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• 
By letter of 1 October 1984 the Committee on Budgetary Control requested 
authorization to draw up a report on the budgetary control aspects of the 
management of Community development aid funds by the European Investment Bank. 
At the plenary sitting of 14 January 1985 the Committee on Budgetary Control 
was authorized to draw up a report on this subject. The Committee on 
Development and Cooperation was asked for its opinion. 
On 20 November 1984 the Committee on Budgetary Control appointed Mr 
DIMITRIADIS rapporteur. His mandate was confirmed on 15 May 1985. 
At its meeting of 18/19 June 1985 the Committee on Budgetary Control 
considered the draft report. The motion for a resolution as a whole was 
adopted unanimously on 18 September 1985. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr AIGNER, chairman; Mr MARTIN, 
vice-chairman; Mrs BOSERUP, vice-chairman; Mr DIMITRIADIS, rapporteur; 
Mr ALBER (deputizing for Mrs LENTZ-CORNETTE), Mr ANASTASSOPOULOS, Mr BARDONG, 
Mr CORNELISSEN, Mr FRUH (deputizing for Mr SCHON), Mr GUERMEUR, Mrs HOFF, 
Mr PITT, Mr PRICE, Mr RYAN, Mr SCHREIBER, Mrs SCRIVENER, Mr SIMMONDS, 
Mr STAVROU (deputizing for Mr MARCK), Mr TOMLINSON (deputizing for Mr WETTIG) 
and Mr WAWRZIK (deputizing for Mr GIUMMARRA). 
The opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation is attached. 
The report was tabled on 23 September 1985. 
The deadline for tabling amendments to this report will be indicated in the 
draft agenda for the part-session at which it will be debated. 
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The Committee on Budgetary Control hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the budgetary control aspects of the management of Community development 
aid funds by the European Investment Bank 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the report of 20 February 19831, on relations between 
the European Parliament and the European Investment Bank and ways in which 
Parliament may supervise the budgetary operations associated with the 
activities of the European Investment Bank, 
having regard to its resolutions on improving political monitoring of the 
borrowing and Lending activities of the European Communities of 13 October 
1981 2 and on the borrowing and Lending activities of the Commission of 
the European Communities of 20 April 19823, 
having regard to the special report by the Court of Auditors on the 
management of Community development aid funds by the European Investment 
Bank, 
having regard to the report by the Committee on Budgetary Control and the 
opinion of the Committee on Development and Cooperation (Doc. A2-95/85), 
A. wishing to continue the work embarked upon in the report of 25 February 
1983, 
B. whereas the European Investment Bank is an autonomous Community 
institution established under the terms of the Treaty of Rome 
(Articles 129 and 130), 
1No. C 128~ 16 May 1983, g. 98 
OJ No. C ~87, 9 November 1981 
3oJ No. c 125, 17 May 1982 
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c. whereas the European Investment Bank is involved on a major scale in the 
implementation of Community development aid policy, 
D. having regard to the basic responsibility of the Commission for the 
implementation of the budget and the fact that Parliament is responsible 
for granting a discharge to the Commission for the implementation of 
development aid, which is confirmed by the internal agreement concerning 
the 5th European Development Fund, 
E. wishing to intensify relations with the European Investment Bank so that 
Parliament is well-informed on its activities in relation to the 
implementation of Community development aid; basing this on the statements 
made by the then President of the European Investment Bank on 24 June 1982 
to the Committee on Budgetary Control that Parliament had a right to 
information in this respect, 
1. Will continue its efforts for democratic control by Parliament of 
financial resources used on behalf of the Community as part of the 
intensification of its links with the European Investment Bank; 
2. Draws attention to the applicability of the principles and provisions of 
the Treaty of Rome and legislation enacted on this basis when the European 
Investment Bank administers Community budget resources on the Latter's 
behalf or issues Loans guaranteed by it; 
3. Reminds the Commission of its responsibility to Parliament, which remains 
undiminished even when Community development aid operations have been 
transferred to the European Investment Bank; stresses the right of the 
Court of Auditors to be given access to the relevant documents at the 
Commission; 
4. Calls on the Commission to make available in its files for scrutiny by the 
European Court of Auditors all documents relevant to decisions on the 
planning and implementation of development aid projects financed by the 
European Investment Bank so as to enable Parliament to exercise its 
supervisory function; 
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5. Believes it absolutely necessary for the Commission to be regularly 
informed on the economic benefit and criteria applied to calculate this 
once projects are completed; welcomes the progress made in this respect 
by the exchange of correspondence between the Commission and the European 
Investment Bank in July 1984; invites the Commission to report more fully 
than in the past on project financing in its annual report on the 
borrowing and Lending activities of the Community; 
6. Recalls its resolution forming part of the decision granting discharge in 
respect of the EDF for 1983, whereby ex post evaluation of projects 
managed by the EIB should be carried out on an increasing scale according 
to a timetable; 
7. Calls on the Commission to ensure in the agreements concluded by it on 
behalf of the Community on the implementation of development projects 
that the Court of Auditors is enabled to ascertain proper implementation 
and assess the economic soundness of measures and more generally to 
ensure that transferral of functions does not impair the quality of 
information; 
8. Believes it necessary when drawing up Legislation, if possible in time 
for the agreement on the Sixth European Development Fund, to give thought 
to a precise delimitation of powers in relation to the allocation of 
tasks, highlighting in particular the audit powers of the Court of 
Auditors; 
9. Adheres to the principle that in the Long term there should be a balance 
between the earnings and expenditure in respect of the development aid 
operations carried out by the European Investment Bank for the Community 
and calls on the Commission to enable the Court of Auditors to assess 
this balance; invites the Court of Auditors to provide the Committee on 
Budgetary Control as soon as possible with a detailed analysis including 
foreseeable future trends; 
10. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Governments of 
the Member States, the Council, the Commission and the European 
Investment Bank. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
1. This report continues the intensive efforts initiated several years ago 
by the Committee on Budgetary Control to make Community development aid 
policy more efficient. The special aspect of this report is that it 
deals with the activities of the European Investment Bank to implement 
this policy. 
2. In various resolutions based on reports by the its Committee on Budgetary 
Control, Parliament has dealt with the question of improving the trans-
parency of EIB activities and the exercise of parliamentary control over 
the implementation of the budget (in the case of transferred 
responsibilities) or the right of Parliament to information on Bank 
activities unrelated to the budget. 
3. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution of 13 October 1981 1 read as 
follows: 
'Feels that the information which it currently receives on the management 
of borrowing and Lending operations to enable it to exercise its powers 
of control - by checking that the management of the operations carried 
out has been regular and efficient and, above all, in accordance with 
political objectives - is fragmentary and incomplete;' 
'Calls on the Commission to submit to its Committee on Budgetary Control 
before 30 September each year a detailed report on all the borrowing and 
Lending operations of the European Communities carried out during the 
previous year ••• ' 
Parliament also calls for a report on relations between the Commission 
and the EIB and expresses a wish for closer cooperation with the EIB on 
the assessment of financing and the coordination of political objectives. 
1-------------------
0J No. C 287, 9.11.1981 
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Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the resolution of 20 April 19821 read 
'Emphasizes that, although still not fully budgetized, borrowing and 
Lending activities are covered by the powers of discharge provided for in 
Article 206(b) of the EEC Treaty and are therefore subject to control by 
the budgetary authority and the Court of Auditors;' 
'Stresses the need to ensure that there is no delegation of powers by the 
Commission to the EIB such as would hinder the exercise by the European 
Parliament of political control over the functioning of the Community's 
financial instruments;' 
4. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the resolution of 15 April 19832 read as follows: 
'Looks for the development of close relations with the European 
Investment Bank, particularly in the form of regular meetings with the 
relevant committees of Parliament, which will allow Parliament a greater 
insight into the range of the Bank's activities; takes note of the 
Bank's initiative of providing it with this information;' 
'Considers that such meetings are all the more necessary in view of the 
particularly significant extension of the nature and volume of the Bank's 
operations in recent years;' 
Parliament also emphasizes that the Commission remains responsible when 
budget resources are administered by the EIB on behalf of the Community. 
5. Finally in its resolution on a discharge of 10 April 1984 concerning the 
implementation of development aid in the 1982 financial year Parliament 
urges that the EIB should in future provide more detailed information on 
the use of EDF resources which it administers on behalf of the Community 
because this is important for control and thus for the discharge 
procedure and because greater transparency is in the interests of all the 
parties involved. 
1oJ No. c 125, 17.5.1982 
2oJ No. c 128, 16.5.1983 
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6. The special report by the Court of Auditors of May 1984 now provides a 
thorough analysis of the management of Community development aid funds by 
the European Investment Bank. 
Subject of scrutiny 
7. The report proceeds on the basis that under Article 205 of the EEC Treaty 
the Commission implements the budget on its own responsibility for which 
it is granted a discharge where appropriate by Parliament under 
Article 206b1• The Commission's reponsibility towards Parliament for 
the Fifth EDF is explicitly mentioned in Article 29(3) of the 1979 
Internal Agreement on the financing and administration of Community aid. 
When the Commission entrusts operations to third parties it retains full 
responsibility: it has an obligation to exercise complete control and is 
fully accountable to the authority granting the discharge or must provide 
the Court of Auditors with full audit powers of scrutiny and enable 
Parliament to exercise its control function. For this reason the comments 
which relate to the activities of the Investment Bank are directed at the 
Commission which is responsible to Parliament. At the same time 
Parliament, as it is often stressed2, is very interested in closer 
relations with the Bank, among other things with a view to improving the 
flow of information. 
The European Investment Bank as a Community institution 
8. The European Investment Bank is an institution set up on the basis of 
Article 3j and Article 129 of the EEC Treaty with Legal autonomy in which 
the supreme body is the Board of Governors. The Bank has its own system 
of and bodies for control. In Article 14(1) of the Protocol on the 
Statutes of the EIB, the responsibility of a Committee appointed by the 
Board of Governors to 'verify that the operations of the Bank have been 
conducted and its books kept in a proper manner' is explicitly formulated. 
2 
See Article 11 of the Internal Agreement of 1979 on the financing and 
management of Community aid (OJ No. L 347, 22 December 1980, pp. 210 et 
seq.) under which the Commission is responsible for implementing the aid 
policy defined by the Council and to the general guidelines defined for 
technical and financial cooperation by the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers 
Report by Mr COUSTE (Doc. 1-1309/82, 25 February 1983) 
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The activities of the EIB in the context of the management development 
aid funds 
9. The EIB plays a major role in Community development aid acting partly on 
the basis on internal agreements between Member States and partly on 
instructions from the Commission. In addition there are in almost all 
cases Loans from EIB own resources. 
The activities of the EIB in this field may be broken down into the 
following categories: 
- management of development aid resources under the Yaounde and Lome 
conventions and agreements for the overseas territorites and regions of 
Member States (financed by contributions from individual Member States 
which do not therefore come under the budget), 
- management of resources under the financial protocols to the 
cooperation agreement between the Community and individual countries in 
the Mediterranean area (resources from Chapter 96 of the budget). 
10. In some cases the EIB's responsibility includes the collection of 
interest and repayments from special loans or the financial and technical 
monitoring of projects financed using risk capital. As far as the Lome 
agreements are concerned, relations between the EIB and the Commission 
are governed by the Internal Agreement on the financing and management of 
Community aid. As regards the resources from Chapter 96 of the budget 
are concerned, relations between the Commission and the bank are governed 
by an agreement between the two institutions which like the internal 
agreement between the Member States establishes a monitoring and 
discharge procedure in accordance with the Bank's Statute. 
11. The development aid resouces administered by the EIB are shown on the 
following table (further tables appear in ANNEX I to this report): 
WG(VS)/2034E 
- 11 - PE 98.244/fin. 
E 
en
 
G'
l 
0 
,.
..
. 
c 
<
 
.
.
, 
en
 
("
) 
.
.
.
, 
tD
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
N
 0 
en
 
V
I 
"
C 
""
' 
tD
 
m
 
("
) 
.
.
.
.
.
 
Ill
 
r
-
.
.
, tD
 
"
C
 
0 ..,
 
.
-
t 0
" 
'
<
 
n
 0 c ..,
 
.
-
t 0 ....
.
 
l>
 
c 
_
_
.
 
0.
. 
N
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
-
t 
0 ..,
 
Il
l 
' ..
.
.
.
.
.
 
0 3 Ill
 
'
<
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
-
o 00
 
""
' 
' "C
 
"
C
 
.
 
""
' 
U
1 
Ill
 
'"
0 
::
I 
m
 
0.
. 
-
o 
""
' 
00
 
-
.
.
.
1 
•
 N
 
""
' 
""
' 
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
.
 
.
.
.
.
 
::
I 
.
 
FU
ND
S 
AU
.C
CA
TE
D 
FO
R 
AC
P 
(l){
MT
IU
FS
 A
ND
 O
.C
.T
. 
a
t 
31
 _
De
ce
m
be
r 
19
82
 
(M
io 
:O
CU
) 
ED
F 
Pe
riO
d 
T
ot
al
 
A
id
s 
m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
EI
B 
A
id
s 
m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
C
cm
ni
ss
io
n 
: 
c
o
v
e
re
d 
a.
J.d
 
.
, 
Ow
n 
r
e
-
S
~
i
a
l
 
In
te
re
st
 
R
is
k 
so
u
rc
e
s 
lo
an
s 
(1
) 
su
bs
id
1e
s 
c
a
pi
ta
l 
1s
t 
ED
F 
19
59
 -
19
64
 
56
9,
4 
-
-
-
-
2n
:iE
D
F 
19
64
 -
19
70
 
80
3,
1 
70
,0
 
50
,0
 
-
(4
) 
-
3r
d 
ED
F 
19
71
 -
19
76
 
1 
01
3,
.8
 
10
0,
0 
88
,2
 (
5)
 
6,
4 
2,
 3
 (
 5)
 
4t
hE
D
F 
19
76
 -
19
80
 
3 
55
5,
9 
40
0,
0 
(3
) 
-
66
,1
 
10
1,
0 
5t
hE
D
F 
19
81
 -
19
85
 
5 
70
2,
3 
90
0,
0 
(3
) 
-
17
9,
6 
29
1,
0 
'IU
I'A
L 
11
 6
44
,5
 1
 4
70
,0
 
13
8,
2 
25
2,
1 
39
4,
3 
Pr
op
:>
rt1
on
 o
f 
to
ta
l 
a1
d 
: 
(%
) 
(10
0%
) 
(12
,6%
) 
(1,
2%
) 
(2,
2%
) 
(3,
4%
) 
(1
) 
~
s
s
1
o
n
 i
s 
pa
rt
ly
 r
e
sp
on
s1
bl
e 
fo
r 
sa
m
e 
pr
oj
ec
ts 
(2
) 
EI
B 
ha
s 
re
s
po
ns
1b
1l
it
y 
fo
r 
c
o
ll
ec
ti
ng
 1
nt
er
es
t 
a
n
d 
re
pa
ym
en
ts
 
(3
) 
Ac
i<
ht1
_o
na
l 
a
rr
o
u
n
ts
 m
ay
 b
e 
gr
an
te
d,
 W
l.t
ho
ut
 i
nt
er
es
t 
su
bs
1d
ie
s 
T
ot
al
 
S
~
i
a
l
 l
oa
ns
 
G
ra
nt
s 
+
 S
ys
rru
n 
(2
) 
+
 S
ta
be
x 
0,
0 
-
56
9,
4 
12
0,
0 
-
68
3,
1 
19
6,
9 
-
81
6,
9 
56
7,
1 
46
9,
5 
2 
51
9,
3 
1 
37
0,
6 
82
7,
0 
3 
50
4,
7 
2 
25
4,
6 
1 
29
6,
5 
8 
09
3,
4 
(19
,4%
) 
(11
 1 1
%
) 
(69
,5%
) 
~
-
(4
) 
In
te
re
st
 s
u
bs
id
1e
s 
n
o
t 
fi
na
nc
ed
 b
y 
ED
F,
 
bu
t 
fro
m
 i
nt
er
es
t 
re
c
e
iv
ed
 b
y 
EI
B 
o
n
 s
pe
ci
al
 l
oa
ns
 
( 5
) 
R
is
k 
ca
p1
 ta
l 
w
as
 
gr
an
te
d 
fr
an
 t
he
 a
ll
oc
at
1o
n 
fo
r 
s
pe
ci
al
 l
oa
ns
 u
n
de
r 
th
e 
3r
d 
ED
F 
FU
ND
S 
AI
.l..C
:X:
AT
ED
 F
OR
 A
IL
 M
ED
IT
ER
RA
NE
AN
 C
XX
JN
TR
IFS
 a
t 
31
 D
ec
er
rb
er
 1
98
2 
(M
io 
ro
J)
 
-
·
 
A
id
s 
m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EI
B 
A
id
s 
rx
:>
t 
ye
t 
a
ll
oc
at
ed
 
a
rr
l 
a
id
s 
m
an
ag
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
C
on
ni
.s
si
on
 
C
om
 tr
y
 
A
gr
ee
ne
nt
 
T
ot
al
 
a
id
 
Ow
n 
r
e
s
-
S
~
i
a
l
 I
nt
er
es
t 
T
ot
al
 
~
i
a
l
 G
ra
nt
s 
T
ot
al
 
so
u
rc
e
s 
lo
an
s 
s
u
bs
id
ie
s 
a
ll
oc
at
ed
 
lo
an
s 
-
'IU
I'A
L 
W
\G
H
RE
B/
W
\S
H
R.
m
 
1 
68
4,
0 
96
2,
0 
37
,8
 
25
,0
 
1 
02
4,
8 
26
0,
2 
39
9,
0 
65
9,
2 
ID
RI
HE
RN
 M
ED
IT
ER
RA
NE
AN
 +
 I
SR
AE
L 
2 
52
6,
0 
1 
59
6,
0 
56
4,
0 
11
7,
9 
2 
27
7,
9 
-
24
8,
1 
24
8,
1 
(an
ne
x 
2 
(l)
) 
'IU
I'A
L 
M
ED
IT
ER
RA
NE
AN
 
R
ff
iiC
N
 
4 
21
0,
0 
2 
55
8,
0 
60
1,
8 
14
2,
9 
3 
30
2,
7 
26
0,
2 
64
7,
1 
90
7,
3 
Pr
op
:>
rt
io
n 
o
f 
to
ta
l 
a
id
 (%
) 
(10
0,0
%)
 (
60
,7%
) 
(14
,3%
) 
(3,
4%
} 
(78
,4%
) 
(6,
2%
) 
(1
5,4
%)
 (
21
,6%
) 
' 
T
ot
al
 
56
9,
4 
68
3,
1 
81
6,
9 
2 
98
8,
8 
4 
33
1,
71
 
9 
38
9,
9 
I 
(00
,6%
)J 
12. For financing where the EIB uses resources from the Community budget, 
Parliament's right to exercise control <over the Commission) follows 
directly from its powers to grant a dhchargfl un~jer Artirlts ;pA~ ~~t "'~ 
Treaty. As far as the other resources used for Community development aid 
policy are concerned, Parliament's right to information on the way in 
which resources have been used derives from its right to consultation on 
the formulation of the main Community objectives1 and its powers to 
grant a discharge where as the financial management of the Fifth EDF is 
directly involved (Article 29(3) of the Internal Agreement (see too 
Article 70(1) of the Financial Regulation of 17 March 1981 for the Fifth 
EDF2)). 
AUDIT OF EIB ACTIVITIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF COMMUNITY 
DEVELOPMENT AID FUNDS 
13. In its annual reports for 19803, 1981 4 and 19825, the Court of 
Auditors pointed out that it is not neither legally nor practically 
feasible for it to check the accounts for the operations carried out by 
the EIB on behalf of the Community. It is important to note out again 
that the Court of Auditors does not have direct access to Bank documents 
and can only consider the documents Lodged with the Commission. 
14. There is no legal restriction on the Court of Auditors' powers of audit 
as far as the development fund is concerned. Statement No. 1 on the 
first sub-section of Article 206a(1) reads as follows: 
'It is agreed that the Court of Auditors shall have jurisdiction to audit 
the operations of the European Development Fund' 
For a justification in detail see the COUSTE report (Doc. 1-1309/82 of 
25 February 1983 
2 OJ No. L 101 of 11 April 1981, p. 2 
3 Paragraphs 14 et seq. 
4 Paragraphs 1.11 et seq.~ p.31 
5 Paragraphs 1.10, 1.11 and 10.29- 10.32 
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Unrestricted audit powers for the Court of Auditors 
15. Under Article 29(2) of the Internal Agreement of 1979 on the financing 
and administration of Community aid, the Court of Auditors exercises its 
powers under the Treaty of Rome in respect of the Fund's operations 
without prejudice to Article 29(4) under which operations managed by the 
Bank are subject to the control and discharge procedures laid down by the 
Statute of the Bank for all its operations. This clearly shows that it 
is a question of two different and independent powers and by no means a 
restriction on the powers of the Court of Auditors. Otherwise the actual 
provisions of Article 29(2) which derives the powers of the Court of 
Auditors from Article 206 of the EEC Treaty would immediately remove them 
again. There must therefore be concurrent powers for the statutory 
control bodies of the bank and the application of the Community's control 
procedure (Court of Auditors) to monitor adherence to the provisions of 
the financial regulation enacted pursuant to Article 28 of the Internal 
Agreement (see Article 209 of the EEC Treaty). This is confirmed by 
Article 29(3) which explicitly grants Parliament the power to grant a 
discharge. 
16. There can be no objection from the Bank or the Commission to full audit 
powers for the Court of Auditors in relation to all operations carried 
out by the Bank on behalf of the Community insofar as the Bank is acting 
on behalf of the Community at the Latter's risk or at the risk of the 
Member States but in the context of a development policy defiAed by the 
Community institutions where control is exercised by the Court of 
Auditors or Parliament indirectly, i.e. via the Commission. Similar 
considerations should apply to all Loans to third countries granted by 
the EIB using its ~ resources but with guarantees from the Community 
(for example Article 969 of the 1984 budget on lending to Mediterranean 
countries). 
17. The same applies to the administration of operations financed from the 
general budget (mainly financial protocols with countries in the 
Mediterranean area, Chapter 96), which provide for the control and 
discharge procedures of the EIB to be applied in accordance with 
WG(VS)/2034E 
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instructions from the Commission1• It would be useful to clarify this 
in the written instructions by stating that the powers of the discharge 
authority and those of the Court of Auditors are in no way affected. 
Under no circumstances can a transferral of authority mean that the 
supervisory institutions defined in the Treaty or agreements of similar 
status are excluded. The Court of Auditors therefore rightly insists on 
the full exercise of its powers and duties. 
Present scope for auditing 
18. As far as the practical problems are concerned, the Court of Auditors 
notes in a number of cases that the documents in the Commission files 
concerning matters transferred to the EIB provide little or no 
information. For example there is a lack of financing proposals, Loan 
contracts and progress reports. Nor are there any receipts or reports 
how the beneficiaries have benefited from the completed investments 
projects. This means that it is impossible for the Court of Auditors, 
which is not allowed to have direct access to EIB documents, to obtain a 
clear picture of the administration of funds. It is also doubtful 
whether the Commission itself is in a position to do this. Frequent 
personal contacts and meetings between the EIB and the Commission are at 
all events no substitute for orderly records being kept at the 
institution which ultimately is responsible for accounting to the 
institution granting the discharge. 
19. This is all the more serious in that in its report on measures to be 
taken in response to the 1981 discharge the Commission referred to a 
willingness on the part of the EIB to provide the information demanded by 
the Court of Auditors (COM<XIX/83, p. 8 et seq.) 2• 
1 
2 
As the financial regulations proposed by the Commission in 1978 were not 
accepted, the Commission began to conclude agreements with the EIB 
regulating relations between the two institutions. 
The Commission notes in this connection : 
'In applying these arrangements, the Commission has operated on the 
principle that the operations should be as transparent as those which it 
manages directly. The Commission and the Bank have therefore agreed that 
the reports on the execution of the Bank's management mandates should 
contain all the information required to enable the Court of Auditors, and 
hence Parliament, to carry out their responsibilities under the Treaty.' 
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20. Only in July 1984 in an exchange of correspondence between the EIB and 
the Commission was it agreed that the flow of information should be 
improved. Under this agreement reports on the implementation and 
auditing of projects, financing proposals, public tenders and awards are 
to be presented in addition to the usual annual report by the 
Commission. The draft Lome III Convention provides explicitly for the 
drawing up of final reports and more extensive follow-up assessment 
programmes. 
Assessment following completion of projects 
21. The evaluation of completed projects in terms of their economic benefit 
and viability and importance for the national economy as a whole is 
becomingly increasingly important, particularly in view of a number of 
mistakes made in the past which are mentioned in the Court of Auditors' 
report and described in more detail in the annual reports on the 
implementation of Community development aid. It was not possible for the 
Court of Auditors to go into detail on any material shortcomings in its 
special report because of the abovementioned incompleteness of Commission 
documentation. 
22. It is important to insist in future that Commission documents contain 
comprehensive reports from the Bank with information on their conclusions 
reached after supervision and in particular the criterion and procedure 
used. The obligation on the EIB and Commission to satisfy themselves as 
to the conditions under which Community aid is being used is explicitly 
set out in Article 25(1) of the 1979 Internal Agreement. Since the EIB 
states that it carries out such checks on projects financed by it on 
behalf of the Community, documentation on this should also be available 
in the Commission files. It would be welcomed if the EIB information, at 
Least to the Commission, was of a comparable standard to that published 
by the World Bank. 
23. It is all the more important for Parliament to be informed on the outcome 
of its development aid policy as this sector has been attracting 
particular attention for several years. Any mistakes and unsuccessful 
projects which turn out not to have been viable must have repercussions 
at political Level if they are to be more successful in future. And it 
is not Least the reputation of the Community as a whole which is at 
stake, especially in the context of development projects. 
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Payment to the Bank for services rendered 
24. The EIB receives various forms of payment for its activities in part from 
the Community budget. It was however established at the outset that the 
aim should be to reconcile expenditure and revenue from the operations 
entrusted to the Bank for implementation. 
1. Commission for administering special loans 
Rates varied according to the Treaty on which they were based (Yaounde 
I, II, Lome I and II) from 0.25 to 0.75% per annum on the balance due. 
2. Commissions for the placement and administration of risk capital 
One-off administration fee: 1.5% and 0.75% commission on the balance 
due. 
3. Updating rates for subsidized loans 
Three-quarters of the amount charged to the beneficiary (before 
deduction of interest subsidies). 
25. For 1982 the Court of Auditors calculated the overall sum paid to the EIB 
from operations on behalf of the Community at some 8.13 m ECU. The Court 
of Auditors assumes by 1986 the annual charges will have risen to 18.4 m 
ECU. 
Calculations of earnings 
26. It is first important to note that this is purely an estimate based on 
the assumption that the amounts lent will in fact be taken up in fuLL on 
schedule (the findings of the Court of Auditors are based on 1982 
figures). But in May 1985, only 150 million of the special loans 
totalling 827 million ECU (see paragraph 2 at the end of the comments by 
the Court of Auditors on the Commission's replies) has been paid out 
whereas the court of Auditors in its table on page 44 of the special 
report clearly assumes more than half the total amounts have been paid. 
It is also important to notice in the context of these special loans that 
so far there has been 30 individual transactions involving 2,400 due 
dates which have had to be monitored and often several reminders sent. 
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27. A distinction should then be made between earnings from fees and earnings 
from capitaL1• Nor can a commission or interest payment be equated 
with profits. Most of the bank's earnings are matched by expenditure. 
Since 1978 the EIB has been operating a computerized cost assessment 
system which calculates precisely the costs of individual items. 
28. In Section V.S of its answers to the comments by the Court of Auditors, 
the Commission compares the expenditure and earnings of the Bank which 
according to Bank calculations produced a considerable annual deficit 
until 1980 as a result of their activities in administering the Yaounde 
and Lome Conventions. 
29. It is particularly important to take inflation into account in relation 
to the earnings quoted in paragraph 2 of the comments by the Court of 
Auditors on the Commission's answers amounting to some 84 m ECU for 
special Loans as part of an overall amount of 827 m over a 40 year period: 
at present-day values 84 m ECU represents a very considerable sum but in 
the course of these 20 years inflation will mean steadily rising 
expenditure on staff and materials. Revenue during the Latter years will 
have to be earned by the Bank at a far higher rate of expenditure 
although it must be conceded that the amount of work involved in paying 
over Loans is of course much greater. 
Discounting subsidized interest rate amounts 
30. The calculation presented by the Court of Auditors in paragraph 31 cannot 
be accepted as it stands: the Court of Auditors estimates a profit of 3% 
from the agreed rate of interest on the Lump sum with a subsidized 
interest rate (three-quarters of the rate it receives from the borrower) 
because the rate of interest on Loans from EIB own-resources in 1981/82 
was 12%. This would be correct if the EIB could use the lump sum at the 
conclusion of the contract in its entirety for refinancing at an 
effective rate of 12%. In practice, however, it cannot Lend this amount 
on such a long term. Moreover there is an exchange rate risk which can 
only be finally calculated once the Last interest payment has been made. 
The fact that the Bank reduced its margin for subsidized loans under the 
second Mediterranean protocol shows, however, that this area is 
problematic (see also paragraph 31). 
1see Annex 6 of the 
types of revenue 
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Premature transfer of interest subsidies 
31. As far as the lump sums paid by the Commission to the EIB as interest 
rate subsidies are concerned, the Court of Auditors complains of the 
advantage to the EIB from the fact that the transfer does not take place 
when the interest is due but once the signing of the loan contract is 
planned, which in some cases means long before disbursement. This lump 
sum (with the compound interest which can be earned in the period) 
contains the full amount of the interest subsidies due. Such early 
transfers do not seem appropriate as the Commission could invest these 
amounts profitably for the benefit of the Community budget. It should be 
noted in this context that under the second Mediterranean agreement the 
procedure criticized by the Court of Auditors has not been applied since 
January 1983. Since then a discounted interest rate subsidy has been 
calculated from the date of the effective disbursement of the Loan and 
transferred to the bank; the discounting rate applied is the loan rate 
reduced by 0.4%. In future, the Lump sum for interest subsidies 
including those under the Lome Convention is to be paid at the earliest 
on the date when the Loan is granted or the first date for repayment of 
interest. Transfers as interest becomes due would not be justified given 
the high administrative costs this would involve. 
32. If such Lump sums have to be paid back, the EIB also pays back the 
accumulated interest: the Court of Auditors observes that the rate for 
calculating the accumulated interest only amounts to three-quarters of 
the rate charged to the borrower. This is perfectly in accordance with 
the appropriate financial regulation. Nevertheless, restitution on the 
basis of applicable market rates would in fact be more appropriate. 
The need for access to EIB calculations sent to the Commission 
33. The Committee on Budgetary Control will not be able to check payments 
made to the EIB until the Court of Auditors deals thoroughly with the 
Commission argument that expenditure in connection with the 
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administration of Loans is higher than the revenue produced. According 
to the Bank the Commission has detailed figures which the Court of 
Auditors should be able to examine so as to give the Committee on 
Budgetary Control a final assessment and enable it to gain a clear 
picture. Information on the most recent development since 1980 is 
particularly important to show whether there is any sign of the trend 
having been reversed. The committee will follow future developments 
closely and in particular the adjustment of the rates of payment to the 
Bank to the present circumstances. The Commission is asked to make 
available to the Court of Auditors all the necessary documentation. 
Problems in connection with cooperation between the Commission and EIB 
34. It was mentioned at the beginning that the Court of Auditors has not been 
able to study the implementation of projects financed by the EIB because 
of the lack of documentation at the Commission. This is mentioned in 
detail at various points in its report (see paragraphs 29, 39, 58 and 
74). As regards tasks transferred to the EIB, the obligation to provide 
comprehensive reporting is inherent in the task itself but for 
clarification it would be desirable to set out in writing what 
information should be supplied to the Commission. This also applies of 
course to the receipts and disbursement requests to be sent to the 
Commission, as for example in the case raised by the Court of Auditors in 
paragraph 29 where no real control on the use of interest subsidies is 
possible because of the inadequate information in the Commission. 
35. In its written instructions the Commission must clearly state which 
documents it needs to carry out its obligations under Article 205 of the 
EEC Treaty. In the internal agreements which the Member States conclude 
on the implementation of development aid there should be greater emphasis 
on the responsibility of the Commission. 
36. The different administrative procedures used by the Commission and the 
EIB might Lead to difficulties for the recipients as possibly not 
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sufficient distinction is made between loans administered by the 
Commission and by the EIB. It would therefore be helpful if there could 
be as much similarity as possible. It is said that the present 
arrangements have led to uncertainty among beneficiaries. 
37. As the EIB itself has no Local delegations, closer cooperation with the 
Commission to make use of its delegations would be desirable and this 
would also mean that the European Community which takes the initiative 
for promoting such projects would present a more coherent image to the 
outside world. This would also ensure regular and cost-effective 
monitoring. 
38. One anomaly in relations between the Commission and the EIB (to which the 
Court of Auditors draws attention in paragraph 28) is that a unanimous 
financing decision by the EIB can provide interest subsidies from budget 
resources for a project which the Commission, the body responsible for 
Community development policy, does not support. Such a provision is 
solely incongruous as Long as the Commission is responsible under Article 
205 for the implementation of the budget. 
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FINANCING PROVIDED ACCORDING TO THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK ANNUAL 
REPORT FOR 1984 
Table 15: Financing from 1959 to 1984 
.. 
Wtthtn me Communtty 
To1a1 Lend•nQ trom Loana unoer maMolt Lendtng !rom NCI 
Year ftna.nc•ng own rc~tttJfres atld gua•antees resources 
1959-1979 13693·6 11 355·0 228·2 277·0 
annuaj 
average 652·1 540·1 10·9 13·2 
1980 3498·5 2 739·0 14·2 197·6 
1981 3831·9 2 523·8 282·1 539·8 
1982 4 695-8 3 453·2 791·1 
1983 5 947 ·8 4 158·1 97-6 1 211·8 
1984 6 903·2 5013·1 1181·8 
Total 38 570·9 29 242·3 622·1 4199·2 
E!B ANNUAL REPORT 1984, p.103 
Table 1· Financing provided In 1984, from 1980 to 1984 and from 1959 to 1984 
Broad breakdown by ongtn of resources and protect locat1on 
1984 
m•llton million 
ECUs 'lo ECUs 
Loans from EIB own resources 
and guarantees 
With,., the Commun1ty 5013·1 72·6 18281·2 
ot,~r,"-n guar:1nrees 393·9 
outs1de t11e Community 620·7 9·0 2 225·9 
Total 5633·8 81·6 20 507·1 
Financing(·') provided from other resources 
(accounted for tn the Spec1al Section) 
w1thtn the Community, from the resources 
of the New Commun1ty Instrument lor 
borrow1ng and lend1ng (NCI) 1 181·8 17 ·1 3 922·1 
outs1de tne Community from Member 
States· or CommuMy budgetary funds 87·6 1·3 448·1 
Total 1269·4 18·4 4 370·2 
Grand Total 6 903·2 100·0 24an.3 
of whiCh Within lilt :ommun1ty 6194·9 89·7 22 203·3 
outs1de the Commun1ty 708·3 10·3 2 674·0 
1 ""'"on • CUsl 
O~o~t'itde 11'\e Com,....ut'llty 
LendtnQ hom Operaltons mountOd ••om 
c..wn resourr.es budgetary resourr:es 
1 165·8 667·6 
55·5 31·8 
371·4 176·3 
396·4 89·8 
410·2 41·3 
427·2 53·1 
620·7 87·6 
3391·7 1115·6 
1~1984 19!:9-19841') 
mdt•o" 
% ECUs ~ 
73·5 29 864·4 77·4 
1·6 622·1 1·6 
8·9 3 391.7 8·8 
82·4 33256·1 86·2 
15·8 4199·2 10·9 
1·8 1115·6 2·9 
17·6 5314·8 13·8 
100·0 38 570·9 100·0 
89·3 34 063·6 88·3 
10·7 4 507·3 11·7 
t') Amounts .:.1 current p11rec; ana e)(chanQe rates A summary ol hnancmg prov•ded over such a lonq penod should btl! •r'llerpreled r:aut•OIJ91V. d.1ta tor 
Ll"''0~"th1u.,l yP;11"i arc aHrch•d by pnce rnnvernonts and exc:har1qe r.11e v.tr•ahoos occ.urnnQ betwcnn 195q and 19M 
c1\ f ),fJu,j~r~q t ut,&Hun ICJ,tn'i anrt loans on sprc.•dl •·ond•hons mrHif' :t¥a•lntJio unc1(1'r the l n1ne Convoni•On'l fl'i tJeCir1tJd by the r.ornnujs•or, ol the E U"'P'Htn 
Cor,muntiLP.S 
~QYBf~: EIB ANNUAL REPORT 1954, p.9 
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' 
Table 5: Financing provided within the Community In 1984, 1983 and from 1980 to 1984 
Geographtcal breakdown 
Belljlum 
Denmartl 
Germany 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
~etherlands 
UMed 
l(,r.gdom 
Non-member 
countnes ( 1) 
Total 
Ol wfuCh 
giJarantees 
From o~n ~ From NCI 
resources resources 
mtlhon mill ton 
ECus ,,, ECUs 'lo 
32·5 0·7 - -
190·0 3·8 134·6 11·4 
134·3 2·7 - -
275·5 5·5 69·3 5·9 
814·0 16·2 386·3 32·7 
124·0 2·5 50·0 4·2 
2538·2 50·6 497·3 42·1 
16·4 0·3 - -
- - - -
888·2 17·7 44·3 3·7 
- - - -
5 013·1100·0 1181·1100·0 
1984 
Total 
mlllton 
ECUs % 
32·5 0·5 
324·6 5·2 
134·3 2·2 
344·8 5·6 
1200·3 19·4 
174·0 2·8 
3035·5 49·0 
16·4 0·3 
- -
932·5 15·0 
- -
6194·9 100·0 
1983 
From own From NCI 
resources resources To tat 
mllhon mtllton mtiiiOn 
ECUs % ECUs "'o ECUs % 
- - - - - -
259·7 6·1 105·4 8·7 365·1 6·7 
152·2 J.6 - - 152·2 2·8 
364·3 8·6 85·3 1·0 449·6 8·2 
707·9 16·6 166·2 15·4 894·1 16·4 
234·6 5·5 69·4 5·7 304·0 5·6 
1945·7 45·7 665·4 54·9 2611·1 47·7 
- - - - - -
- - - - - -
591·3 13·9 100·1 8·3 691·4 12·6 
- - - - - -
4255·7 100·0 1211·1 100·0 5487·5 100·0 
97·6 2·3 
1960-'984 
From own From NCt 
resources resources Total 
mtlhon mtllton million 
ECUs /, ECUs % ECUs ... 
428·7 2·3 - - 428-7 1 ·9 
88J.o 4·8 354·2 9·0 1237·2 5·6 
613·6 3·4 
- -
613·6 2·8 
1117·1 6·1 279·6 7·1 1396·6 6·3 
2451·9 13·4 650·4 16·6 3102·3 14·0 
, 343·7 7·4 261·5 6·7 1605·2 1·2 
8 476·4 46·4 2198·2 56·0 10674·6 46·1 
16·4 0·1 
- -
16·4 0·1 
- - - - - -
2 876·8 '15·7 178·3 4·6 3055·1 13·7 
73·6 0·4 - - 73·6 0·3 
18281·2 100·0 3922·1100·0 22203·3 100·0 
393·9 2·2 
t'l Loans graoted on accordance woth the second paragraph of Art1c1e 18 (11 of the Banks Statute. empowenng the Board ol Governors to aulho.,se the Bank 10 cont••Oute 
towards ftnanctng pro,ects outs•de. but ot dtrect tnlerestto. the Commun•ty 
~Q\o!R~s: EIS ANIJUAL. REPORT, 1984, p. 35 
Table 21: Financing provided from 1980 to 19841n the Mediterranean region 
Breakdown by prOJect locatton and ong1n of resources 
Loanetrom Operations mounted from 
own resources budgetary lunda 
m11i10n ECUs % m,n,on ECUs .... 
Candidates for accession 784·0 50·8 
Spatn 390·0 25·2 
Ponugal 394·0 25·4 
Other countries 766·8 49·4 209·5 100·0 
Nonhern Med1terranean (1) 314·0 20·2 114·0 83·0 
Yugoslavta 260·0 16·7 
Tur.<ey 54·0 3·5 174·0 83·0 
·Maghreb 176·0 11·4 21·5 10·3 
AI gena 30·0 1·9 
Morocco 120·0 7·8 5·0 2·4 
Tun1s1a 26·0 1·7 16·5 7·9 
MashreQ 206·8 13·3 10·0 4·8 
Egypt 1 15·5 7·4 3·0 1 ·4 
Jordan 33·0 2·1 1·0 3·4 
Lebanon 20·0 1·3 
Syna 38·3 2·5 
Other 70·0 4·5 4·0 1·9 
Cyprus 20·0 1·3 4·0 1·9 
Israel 50·0 3·2 
Malta 
Total 1 550·8 100·0 209·5 100·0 
p, Aoc.~ onar to 101 ·0 md!ton from own resources.'" respect of lend,ng '" Greece '" 1980 
~Q\o!B£f: EIB ANf~U/\L REPORT 1984, p. 116 
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Total 
m1t110n ECUs ... 
784·0 44·5 
390·0 22·1 
394·0 22·4 
976·3 55·5 
488·0 27·8 
260·0 14·8 
228·0 13·0 
197·5 11·2 
30·0 1·7 
125·0 7·1 
42·5 2·4 
216·8 12·3 
118·5 6·1 
40·0 2·3 
20·0 1 ·1 
38·3 2·2 
.. 
74·0 4·2 
24·0 1·4 
50·0 2-8 
1780·3 100·0 
PE 98.244/fin./Ann.I 
Table 23: Financing provided from 1978 to 19841n the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States and the Overseas 
Countries and Territories (OCT) under the Lome Conventions 
Breakdown by pro1ec1 location and ong1n of resources 
(molhon ECUtl 
Rosk capllal operaflons 
1 <~<in~ from own teSGtJ•ce~ motmted trom budgetary funds Total lonanroniJ (1) 
1stlumt3 0/n<J Lome ~ s: tom~ 2nd Lome 1st Lome 2nd Lome 
C.onvent•on Cunver•lton .. ota: Cor.ventton Con\lentton ··otal Conventton Convent•on Tot•l 
ACP Statu: Total 390·0 446·7 83S·7 99·71 208·46 308·17 469·71 655·18 1144·87 
OCT 7·0 3·0 10·0 2·05 5·14 7·19 9·05 8·14 17·19 
Grand Total 397·0 449·7 846·7 101·78 213·6 315·36 498·76 663·3 1162·06 
(', E•o:.~ "9 f•nancong prov•ded between 1964 and 1976 under the two Yaounde Convenflons. amoun!lng to 146· 1 million trom own resources and •~2 ""•ll•on trco,- EOF 
re~v,~rt:es 
EIB ANNUAL REPORT, 1984, p. 118 
.. 
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OPINION 
<Rule 101 of the Rules of Procedure) 
of the Committee on Development and Cooperation 
Draftsman: Mrs L,SCHMIT 
On 21 November 1984, the Committee on Development and Cooperation appointed 
Mrs L SCHMIT draftsman of an opinion. 
At its meeting of 26 March 1985, the committee considered the draft opinion. 
It unanimously adopted its conclusions on 25 April 1985. 
The following took part in the vote: 
Mrs FOCKE, chairman; Mr BERSANI and Mr WURTZ, vice-chairmen; Mrs SCHMIT, 
draftsman; 
Mr ANDREWS, Mr BAGET BOZZO, Mr BALFE, Mrs BUCHAN, Mrs CINCIARI RODANO, 
Mr COHEN, Mrs DALY, Mrs DE BACKER VAN OCKEN, Mr MOUCHEL (deputizing for 
Mr FLOSSE), Mr NORMANTON (deputizing for Mr de COURCY LING), Mrs PANTAZI, 
Mrs PERY, Mrs RABBETHGE, Mrs SIMONS, Mr SIMPSON, Mr ULBURGHS (deputizing for 
Mr PANNELLA), Mr VERBEEK and Mr VERGEER. 
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A. OPINION OF THE COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENT AND COOPERATION 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation: 
1. Fully appreciates the value of the presentation by the Court of Auditors 
of a special report on the management of Community development aid funds 
by the EIB and, more generally, stresses its desire for increased 
cooperation with the Court of Auditors through the presentation of special 
reports; 
2. Notes the important role played by the EIB in the implementation of the 
EEC's development policy with regard both to the ACP States and the 
Maghreb and Mashreq countries, while stressing that this role should be 
further extended to meet the growing need of these countries for easier 
access to the international capital market and private foreign investment; 
asks to reconsider how the EIB can broaden its scope and what sort of 
specific proposals can be made by the Member States to enable the Bank to 
extend Loans to non-associated developing countries; 
3. Stresses the important specific contribution which the EIB ought to make 
as a banking institution, particularly in the field of industrial 
cooperation through the issuing of Loans from its own resources together 
with interest rate subsidies and risk capital; 
4. Stresses that the justification for the EIB's Lending operations Lies in 
the development aims which were clearly defined in the ACP-EEC Conventions 
and in the Mediterranean financial protocols, and considers that, 
therefore, the EIB's aim should be to achieve a balance between revenue 
and expenditure, rather than a profit in carrying out its operations; 
5. In order to ensure that this aim is constantly pursued, calls on the 
Commission, in collaboration with the EIB, to undertake detailed economic 
and financial studies of the costs associated with the Bank's operations, 
so as to determine to what extent a review of the Bank's revenue is 
necessary, particularly that relating to special Lending operations and 
Loans enjoying interest rate subsidies; 
6. Deplores the EIB's attitude, which all too often seems to be based on the 
solvency of a country or the pursuit of strict financial viability; 
7. Stresses the need for still greater exchange of information and 
coordination between the Commission and the EIB in order to ensure that 
the EEC's aid measures are as effective as possible; calls for the 
provisions on this matter in the act establishing the EDF to be 
scrupulously observed and considers that the exchange of Letters in 1984 
between the Commission and the EIB should help to improve the situation in 
this field, notably by improving project evaluation; 
8. Deeply regrets that in the case of many earlier agri-industrial projects, 
where the agricultural side was managed by the Commission and the 
industrial side managed by the EIB, the two institutions acted entirely 
independently of each other, a policy which is Likely to jeopardize the 
success of any development project; 
9. Stresses that, above and beyond the management powers assigned to the EIB, 
the Commission retains a responsibility for monitoring the implementation 
of the aid policy defined by the Council and the financial and technical 
cooperation policy Laid down by the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers and the 
corresponding bodies set up under the Maghreb-Mashreq agreements; 
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10. Points out that, in addition to its powers in the field of budgetary 
control and discharge, the European Parliament has called for measures 
taken within the framework of the new ACP-EEC Convention to be subject to 
parallel control and assessment by the Commission, the Court of Auditors 
and Parliament, as this is the only way of ensuring that optimum use is 
made of these funds; 
11. Reiterates its desire for a closer and more continuous dialogue with the 
EIB, while respecting the independent status of the Bank in the Community 
structure, so as to enable the European Parliament to assess the extent to 
which the EIB's operations are contributing to the achievement of the 
priority development aims of the European Community; 
12. Calls on the Commission to report regularly to it both on the Bank's 
management of budget aid for which the European Parliament is the 
budgetary and discharge authority, and on the management of EDF funds, 
over which Parliament should be able to exercise the same control as it 
does over the management activities performed by the Commission; 
13. Requests that the Committee on Development and Cooperation of the European 
Parliament be permitted to draw up a report on the Bank's role, objectives 
and future operating and control procedures in connection with the 
Community's development policy - taking into account both the current 
moves to reform the Community institutions and the increased resources 
which the Bank will have to administer under the new Lome Convention. 
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B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. THE PRESENT SITUATION 
The European Investment Bank is responsible for administering the 
appropriations destined on the one hand for the ACP States and, on the other, 
for seven developing Maghreb and Mashreq countries. 
For its operations in the ACP countries, the EIB has at its disposal 
appropriations from the EDF, in addition to the funds it allocates from its 
own resources, whereas, for the Mediterranean countries - in addition to the 
funds granted from its own resources - it uses appropriations from the EEC 
budget (Chapter 96). 
In financial terms, the Second Lome Convention entrusted the EIB with 
the management of 280m ECU from the EDF(1) plus 685 m ECU to be used from-its 
own resources, these Latter appropriations being coupled with an interest rate 
reduction granted by virtue of the quota of EDF subsidies specifically 
earmarked for this purpose(2). The new Convention of Lome Ill entrusts the 
EIB with the management of 600 m ECU from the EDF(3) plus 1,100 m ECU to be 
used from its own resources , these appropriations being accompanied by an 
interest rate reduction financed from the resources of the EDF, on the same 
terms as under the present Convention. 
The Maghreb and Mashreq countries receive a total of 560 m ECU allocated 
by the EIB from its own resources(4). In addition, the EIB administers both 
the appropriations forming part of the non-reimbursable aid aimed at reducing 
the interest rate on Loans granted by the EIB from its own resources, and 
those appropriations appearing under the heading of special Loans in 
application of cooperation agreements granted to sectors other than rural 
development and social infrastructure. 
Apart from the management of the funds which it obtains from its own 
resources and the quota of the appropriations which, after being deducted 
either from the EDF subsidies or from the subsidies provided for under the 
Mediterranean financial protocols - and included in the EEC budget - are used 
to reduce interest charges on loans issued from its own resources, the 
criteria governing the EIB's powers of management depend, with regard to the 
ACP countries, on the nature of Loans issued and, with regard to the Maghreb 
and Mashreq countries, on the sectors concerned by the operations financed. 
This type of funding represents a form of financial aid specifically adapted 
to the financial situation and economic conditions of these countries, 
particularly as it allows financial participation in undertakings and the 
financing of preparatory studies for projects. 
<1>Funds in the form of risk capital 
(2)A maximum of 175 m ECU in accordance with the Internal Agreement of 1979 
on the funding and administration of Community aid, OJ No L 347, 22.1,?,.1980 
(3)Funds in the form of risk capital 
{4)See opinion by Mr NARDUCCI on behalf of the Committee on Development ~nd 
Cooperation on the conclusion of new financial protocols between the · · 
European Economic Community and certain southern Mediterranean countries -
Doc. 1-846/82 of 15 November 1982 
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With regard to the Mediterranean countries, the EIB administers Loans 
which concern sectors other than rural development and social infrastructure, 
as we have seen above. 
From the Legal and institutional point of view, the management 
operations performed by the EIB can be seen in a substantially different Light 
according to whether they concern cooperation between the ACP and the EEC or 
with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries. 
The scope of the role of the EIB, which is assigned the task of 
administering certain funds from the EDF under the Lome Convention, is laid 
down in the legal act establishing the European Development Fund(1), which 
gives a detailed definition of the breakdown of responsibilities and the 
relations between the EIB and the Commission for the management of the EDF. 
In particular, Article 29(4) of this text states that: 'the operations 
financed from the resources of the Fund and managed by the Bank shall be 
subject to the control and discharge procedures Laid down by the statute of 
the Bank for all its operations. Each year the Bank shall send the Commission 
and the Council a report on the execution of operations financed from the 
resources of the Fund and managed by the Bank.' 
With regard to the agreements with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, as 
the Court of Auditors has stressed, neither the cooperation agreements nor the 
financial protocols define how the management responsibilities should be 
divided between the EIB and the Commission. As no financial regulation has 
yet been adopted<2>, the EIB is acting under a mandate given by the Commission 
which in this case concerns the management of Community funds in the strict 
sense of the word, since they appear in Chapter 96 of the EEC budget. 
With regard to the funds granted from its own resources, in both cases 
the EIB administers these in accordance with the provisions of its statute. 
This applies also to the control and discharge procedures. 
Under the terms of Article 206a of the EEC Treaty, the Court of Auditors 
is required to examine the accounts of all revenue and expenditure of the 
Community. It draws up an annual report at the close of each financial year. 
It may also submit observations on specific questions at any time and it is 
under this provision that the Court has drawn up the special report on which 
we are required to deliver an opinion. 
II. MAIN PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In response to the main criticisms made by the Court of Auditors -
inadequate control of the EIB's management operations by the Commission, and 
thus also by the Court of Audi~ors and the European Parliament, particularly 
as regards the compliance of the Bank's operations with the EEC's development 
policy aims, inadequate coordination between the EIB and the Commission and 
(1) For the Fifth EDF under the Convention of Lome II, see <2>, p. 7 
(2) See OJ No C 99, 22.4.1977, proposal for a Council regulation 
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the excessive cost of the EIB's intervention - it should be pointed out that 
our committee has adopted a number of positions which ought to be applied to 
the activities of the EIB, and its relations with the Commission and the 
European Parliament. 
The Committee on Development and Cooperation has stressed on numerous 
occasions the need for the developing countries, particularly the ACP 
countries, to secure additional finance at reduced cost by using the resources 
of the international capital market and to attract private foreign investment 
(1). The committee has also declared its support for extending the EIB's 
field of intervention(2). 
On the basis of the conclusions of its Working Party on ACP-EEC 
Industrial Cooperation, the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly declared its support 
for a substantial increase in resources for industrial cooperation, notably in 
the form of interest rate subsidies and risk capital(3). 
The EIB's operations- both those which are financed out of its own 
resources and those using the other types of appropriations which it 
administers - must be carried out in conformity with and within the strict 
framework of the EEC's development aims. The Lome conventions are very clear 
on this subject(4). The same applies to the different financial protocols 
concluded with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries(5). 
In this respect, it should be stressed that the aim of the EIB's 
operations, as the Commission itself points out in its replies to the Court of 
Auditors, should be to achieve a balance between revenue and expanditure and 
not a profit. In order to ensure strict and constant compliance with this aim 
and in view of the criticisms made by the Court of Auditors, particularly as 
regards special Loans and interest rate subsidies, the Commission must be 
urged to undertake appropriate financial and economic studies, in 
collaboration with the Bank, to determine whether a review of the Bank's 
revenue procedures is necessary. 
Furthermore, the Internal Agreement establishing the Fifth EDF(6), after 
drawing a distinction between operations which are the responsibility of the 
EIB and of the Commission, stipulates that the Latter shall monitor the 
implementation of the aid policy Laid down by the Council and by the ACP-EEC 
Council of Ministers. The same provision has been Laid down within the 
framework of cooperation with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries<?>. 
(1) Reports by Mr Jackson on Community policy towards developing countries, 
OJ No C 242, 12. 9.1983 and by Mr Irmer on the context of the future 
ACP-EEC convention to follow Lome II, OJ No C 277, 17.10.1983 
<2> Jackson report, op. cit. 
(3) Resolution on ACP-EEC Industrial Cooperation and the impact of the Lome 
Convention, OJ No C 300, 7.11.1983 
(4) Articles 91, 92 and 95 of the Convention of Lome II -Articles 185 and 194 
of the Convention of Lome II 
(5) See for instance the Second Financial Protocol between Algeria and the 
EEC, Article 2, OJ No L 337, 29.11.1982, page 3 
(6) See (2) p. 7 
(7) See (2) p. 8 
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The Committee on Development and Cooperation, which has constantly 
stressed the need for the closest possible coordination between the various 
operators in the field of development, wishes to emphasize that the greatest 
possible exchange of information and coordination between the Commission and 
the EIB are vital to ensure that Community aid operates with maximum 
efficiency. 
It should be pointed out that the Internal Agreement establishing the 
Fifth EDF includes a whole series of precise provisions which, if strictly 
observed, should allow satisfactory information and coordination at each of 
the following different stages: planning, drawing up of target programmes for 
each country and, if appropriate, re-evaluation of the programmes during the 
period of their application, requests and decisions concerning financing and 
finally, regular assessments. The new draft Internal Agreement of 1985 
establishing the Sixth EDF also includes the same provisions and improves on 
certain aspects of them(1). 
In addition, an exchange of letters between the Commission and the EIB 
in July 1984 gave details of the information, in respect both of the ACP and 
the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, which should be provided to the Commission 
and to the delegations located in the countries concerned, and led to the 
reorganization of the procedures for centralizing this information within the 
Directorate of Finance of DG VIII. This should help to improve the situation 
still further in future. 
In any case, it should be stressed that the information supplied by the 
EIB must no longer be confined to data concerned strictly with accountacy but 
should include firm details making it possible to assess the Bank•s activities 
and their impact on the development of the projects it finances. 
It is worth remembering that the rapporteur of the ACP-EEC Working Party 
on Industrial Cooperation and the Lome Convention pointed out in his 
explanatory statement, with regard to the lack of coordination between the EIB 
and the Commission, that •these observations, which may have been justified 
at one time or another, are no longer valid today 1 (2). 
The European Parliament and its Committee on Development and Cooperation have 
on numerous occasions called for the EDF to be included in the budget, while 
stressing the serious disadvantages of the present situation, particularly as 
regards the control of financial resources. 
These serious disadvantages remain in respect of the application of the 
new Convention of Lome III, since the EDF has not been included in the budget 
and the new draft Internal Agreement establishing the Sixth EDF -currently 
being ratified by the Member States - retains the same provisions, 
particularly those placing the EIB's operations outside the control of the 
Court of Auditors. 
(1) Internal Agreement of 1985 on the funding and administration of Community 
aid, text forwarded by the Council 
(2) Report by Mr Fuchs, Publication of the ACP-EEC Consultative Assembly, 
paragraph 80, p.31 
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With regard to the negotiations on the Convention of Lome III, the 
European Parliament and its Committee on Development and Cooperation have 
called for 'continuous on-going monitoring and evaluation of all measures 
under the new ACP-EEC Convention by the Commission, the European Court of 
Auditors and the European Parliament as this is the only means of achieving an 
optimum use of financial resources'(1). 
More specifically, the Lack of information on the management of EFD resources 
by the EIB has aroused the criticism of the Committee on Development and 
Cooperation. This was again the case recently in connection with the 
discharge for the financial year 1983(2). 
Some time ago the committee had called for the establishment of 'closer and 
more continuous dialogue' with the EIB(3). Since then Parliament has stressed 
that, 'in accordance with the Bank's autonomous status within the Community 
structure and with the powers of its decision-making bodies in particular, it 
must be in a position to assess how far the Bank's operations contribute to 
the achievement of the Community's prime objectives'(4). 
In conclusion, your rapporteur wishes to reiterate this request. 
(1) Report by Mr Irmer, op. cit., resolution paragraph 88 
(2) Opinion by Mr Vergeer, paragraph 22, PE 95.193/fin., 27.2.1985 
(3) Report by Mr Michel on the assessment of Community development policies 
and the role of the European Parliament, resolution paragraph 9, 
OJ No C 260, 12.10.1981 
(4) Resolution on relations between the European Parliament and the European 
Investment Bank, OJ No. C 128, 16.5.1983. 
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